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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
E. L.ALLEN, 
Pla-intiff, 
vs. 
LEWIS V. TRUEMAN, Judge of the 
Second Judicial District of the State 
of Utah; JOSEPH HOLBROOK, 
Sheriff of Davis County, Utah; 
CALVIN G. ROBERTS, Deputy 
Sheriff of Davis County, State of 
Utah; DAVID F. SMITH, Commis-
sioner of Agriculture of the State of 
Utah; and C. G. McCULLOCH, 
Deputy Inspector of the Utah State 
Commission of Agriculture, 
Defendants. 
Case No. 6194 
Defendants' Brief 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In the summer of 1939, and for many years prior 
thereto, the Plaintiff, E. L. Allen, maintained, and at the 
present time still maintains, what he denominates a "cream 
station" on the east side of Highway No. 91 at the south 
boundary of Davis County, Utah, immediately north of 
Salt Lake City, Utah, where he engages in the business of 
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selling milk and cream. The cream station is located in 
a sparsely populated area and the Plaintiff operates no 
routes to deliver his milk and cream, but relies entirely 
upon the traffic passing his door for his customers. 
Salt Lake City has enacted the United States public 
health ordinance relative to milk, 
Article V, Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City, 
1934 
which ordinance prohibits the sale of fluid milk in Salt Lake 
City, Utah, which is not produced, handled and sold in 
accordance with the standards therein set forth. Any pro-
ducer or distributor of milk complying with the standards 
set forth in said ordinance is put to considerable expense 
over and above the costs which normally accrue through 
the production and distribution of milk. The milk and 
cream sold by Plaintiff have not at any time been produced 
according to the requirements of the Salt Lake City milk 
ordinance. 
The following dairies do business in Salt Lake City, 
Utah, and the milk that they buy, process and distribute 
complies in all respects with the milk ordinance of Salt Lake 
City for Grade "A" milk. Each of the following named 
dairies has a distinctive trade-mark, consisting of words, 
design and color, which trade-mark is registered with the 
Secretary of State of Utah, as provided by Title 95, Revised 
Statutes of Utah, 1933, and amendments thereto. These 
trade-marks are permanently affixed to all of the refillable 
glass milk containers used by these respective dairies, which 
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said dairies, their trade names and trade-marks are as 
follows: 
Na·me Owne-r 
Arden _____________ _Midwestern Dairy 
Products Co. ________________ Arden 
Bountiful ____ _Bountiful Dairy ______________ Bountiful 
Clover-Leaf Clover Leaf Harris 
Harris___________ Dairy ____________________________ Clover-Leaf 
Harris 
Clover Leaf _______ Clover Leaf Harris 
Dairy -------------------------Clover Leaf 
Fisher Lester Fisher ________________ Fisher 
Golden Glory __ Salt Lake Milk Pro-
ducers Ass'n ________________ Golden Glory 
Green Meadow 
Farm ______ Green Meadow Farm 
Dairy ________________________ Green Meadow 
Farm 
Harris Jersey 
Farm ___ _____E. F. Harris __________________ Harris Jersey 
Farm 
Hatch ______ c. M. Egan djbja Hatch 
Farm Dairy _________________ Hatch 
Mill Creek ___ John Rowell __________________ Mill Creek 
Moss Walter H. Moss _______________ Moss 
Romney ____ c. B. Stewart Romney ____ Romney 
Royal ______ Royal Dairy Products 
Company ______________________ Royal 
Rosehill __________ E. Maddocks _______________ _ __ Rosehill 
Superior _____ Superior Dairy Com-
pany _____________________________ Superior 
Winder ______ George, J. R. and Ed-
win K. Winder djbja 
Winder Dairy ______________ Winder 
Hamilton Bros. ____ Hamilton Bros. Dairy ____ Hamilton Bros. 
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The above dairies handle in excess of 907o of all milk 
sold in Salt Lake City, Utah. 
There are other dairies in Salt Lake having registered 
trade-marks and said trade-marks are permanently attached 
to the bottles in which they deliver their milk and cream. 
For many years last past the dairies in Salt Lake have 
maintained and opera ted a bottle exchange, to which all of 
the dairies take any bottles gathered by their drivers, ex-
cept their own trade-marked bottles. There the dairy is 
given credit and there each dairy may withdraw all the 
bottles received by the exchange which bears its registered 
trade-mark, for which latter service a fee is charged, the 
difference in the amount credited and charged being the 
amount necessary to defray the cost of operating the ex-
change. The service of this exchange has been and now is 
available to Plaintiff. 
A milk bottle is worth approximately 8c and the dairies 
in Salt Lake City annually purchase approximately $50,-
000.00 worth of bottles. This bottle cost is added to the price 
that the public must pay for its milk. The largest part of 
this cost is due to theft and wrongful abstraction of bottles 
by junk men, second-hand dealers and to dairymen located 
outside of Salt Lake, who have found that they can buy 
trade-marked bottles of Salt Lake dairies for less than they 
can buy new bottles from the glass companies. 
In 1928, this Honorable Court told the dairy industry 
in Salt Lake City, in the case of 
Clover Leaf Dairy v. Van Gerven, 269 P. 1020, 
72 Utah 290, 60 A. L. R. 281, 
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that it could not restrain another dairy from using its 
trade-marked bottles because the industry had established 
the practice of extracting a deposit for the bottle when the 
milk was sold through stores, and that this gave the pur-
chaser the right to use the bottle. Mr. Justice Thurman, 
however, pointed out the remedy as follows: 
"But, as already foreshadowed in what has been 
said, plaintiffs have in their own hands just as com-
plete a remedy for the injuries complained of as a 
court of equity can afford them. They can commence 
now to do what we have suggested they should have 
done when they first put their trademarked bottles 
in circulation. They can contract with their cus-
tomers to return their trademarked bottles or be 
responsible therefor. When they have once estab-
lished that custom, their trademark will be of some 
value. It will be prima facie evidence of ownership, 
and the traffic in bottles bearing their trademarks 
will either cease or be done at the peril of those who 
engage in the traffic." 
Since that time the industry has religiously followed 
the advice of Justice Thurman and has an express or im-
plied agreement with its customers that they will return 
the trade-marked containers after the contents have been 
used. 
The only two exceptions within Salt Lake City and 
environs to the system of distributing and recovering re-
fillable glass milk containers are the Paramount Dairy, 
which sells the container for 8c with the milk and agrees 
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to repurchase the container when returned (to which sys-
tem no one can take exception) and the Plaintiff in this 
matter, who indiscriminately fills the trade-marked bottles 
of others and extracts a deposit of 5c. 
On the 26th of July, 1939, C. G. McCulloch, at the 
behest of the milk industry in Salt Lake City, made an 
affidavit before the Honorable Judge Lewis V. Trueman, 
Judge of the Second Judicial District Court of Davis County, 
Utah, alleging that on the 13th of July, 1939, he had gone 
to the place o.f business of E. L. Allen. That at said time he 
had found about 200 refillable glass milk containers being 
used by plaintiff bearing the trade-marks and trade names of 
other dairies in Salt Lake City, Utah. Also, said C. G. McCul-
loch alleges that on the 22nd day of June, 1938, a search and 
seizure warrant had been directed to the place of business of 
said E. L. Allen and approximately 800 refillable glass milk 
containers bearing the trade-mark of other dairies had been 
seized. Affiant further swore that he had been advised 
by numerous persons who had purchased milk and cream 
at said Allen cream station that in practically every instance 
the milk and cream purchased had been contained in a 
refillable glass milk container bearing the trade-mark and 
trade name of a dairy located in Salt Lake City, Utah, other 
than the trade-mark and name of said E. L. Allen. 
Pursuant to said affidavit a search and seizure war-
rant was issued directing the Sheriff of Davis County to 
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search the premises of said E. L. Allen and to ~eiZl' the 
trade-marked and trade-named refillnble glass milk bottle~ 
of any of the following dairies. bearing any of tht~ follow-
ing trade-marks : 
Owner 
Midwestern Dairy Products Co. 
Bountiful Dairy 
Tmdi'-Ma rk 
Arden 
Bountiful 
Clover Leaf Harris Dairy _ CloYer-Leaf lh rris 
Clover Leaf Harris Dairy Clover Leaf 
Lester Fisher ______________________________________ Fisher 
Salt Lake Milk Producers Ass'n __ . __ Golden Glory 
Green Meadow Farm Dairy _ Green Meadow Farm 
E. F. Harris _______________________________________ .Harris Jersey Farm 
C. M. Egan d,lb, a Hatch Farm Dairy Hatch 
Mill Creek Dairy_ _ ______________ _ __ Mill Creek 
Walter H. Moss ________________ -----------------------------------
C. B. Stewart Romney ______ ------------------------------ _ 
Royal Dairy Products Co. 
E. Maddocks ____ ____ _ _____________________________ _ 
Superior Dairy Company ___________________________ _ 
George, J. R. and Edwin K. Winder, 
l\'loss 
Romney 
Royal 
Rosehill 
Superior 
djbja Winder Dairy ____________________ ______________ _ _ \Vinder 
Hamilton Bros. Dairy _______________________________ Hamilton Bros. 
After said search and seizure warrant had been issued, 
a search was made of the premises by Calvin G. Roberts, 
deputy sheriff of Davis County, who thereupon seized the 
following refillable glass milk containers : 
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Trade-Mark Owner 
Arden ______________________ Midwestern Dairy 
Products Co. _______________ _ 
Bountiful _______________ Bountiful Dairy ____________ _ 
Clover-Leaf Harris_ Clover Leaf Harris _________ _ 
Clover Leaf ______________ Clover Leaf Harris 
Fisher _____________________ Lester Fisher _______________ _ 
Golden Glory _______ Salt Lake Milk 
Producers Ass'n __ 
Hamilton Bros. _______ Hamilton Bros. Dairy 
Harris Jersey 
Farm ____________________ E. F. Harris _________ _ 
Hatch __________________ c. M. Egan d/b/a 
Hatch Farm Dairy _____ _ 
Mill Creek __ __ _ _ _____ Mill Creek Dairy ___________ _ 
Romney ____________________ C. B. Stewart Romney ___ _ 
Moss _______________________ Walter H. Moss _______________ _ 
Royal ________________________ Royal Dairy Products Co. 
Rosehill ___________________ E. Maddocks 
Superior __________________ Superior Dairy Co. ________ _ 
'iVinder ___________________ George, J. R. and Edwin 
K. Winder djbja Win-
der Dairy 
~ 
<:r.l ...... 
;..;, 
~ ·~ ~ ~ ~ ·~ ~ 0 Q. 
96 17 1 
23 2 
2 
142 16 4 
4 1 
40 164 3 
12 2 
65 8 2 
12 1 3 
5 2 1 
1 
13 4 1 
26 5 
18 1 
12 1 
14 2 
--
485 225 14 
Upon the return of the search and seizure warrant being 
made to the District Court, Defendant Lewis V. Trueman 
issued a warrant of attachment directing said Calvin G. 
Roberts to hold said property until further order of the 
court. Immediately thereafter notice of the seizure of said 
containers was served upon all of the owners of the trade-
marks listed above and in addition thereto notice was 
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served upon Plaintiff E. L. Allen and one was posted in 
his cream station, above referred to, each notice specifying 
that any one claiming any interest in and to any of the 
bottles should file a claim with the court on or before 
August 19, 1939, at which time the court would hold a hear-
ing to determine the parties entitled to the possession of 
said refillable glass milk containers. 
Thereafter, claims were duly filed by all of the dairies 
above mentioned, claiming the refillable glass milk contain-
ers set forth in the return of the deputy sheriff, Calvin G. 
Roberts. No claim was ever filed by E. L. Allen to the 
effect that he was the owner of or entitled to the possession 
of any of said refillable glass milk containers. Upon the 
application of counsel for Allen the hearing on said matter 
was continued from the 19th of August, 1939, and before 
the same was heard the Defendants in the above entitled 
matter were served with an alternative writ of prohibition, 
on the ground, presumptively, that the Plaintiff did not 
have any plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary 
course of law. 
DISCUSSION OF THE FACTS 
It becomes very apparent from the Defendants' state-
ment of the case that it is similar only in general outline 
with that set forth in Plaintiff's brief. Our judicial system 
provides a method for resolving disputed questions of fact 
and it seems to have been Plaintiff's desire, as evidenced 
by his application for an alternative writ of prohibition, to 
circumvent and avoid a determination of the facts in this 
matter. 
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The sole reason and purpose for Plaintiff's petition for 
writ of prohibition is to test the constitutionality of Sec-
tions 95-2-10, Revised Statutes of Utah, as amended by 
Chapter 110, Session Laws of Utah, 1939. Plaintiff is in 
effect asking this Court, without the aid of any evidence of 
any nature whatsoeve1·, to pass upon the reasonableness 
of the classifications therein created, to determine certain 
facts which must be determined before the applicability of 
the sections may be determined. 
According to Defendants' view point, Plaintiff's state-
ment of the case is inaccurate. In the first place, in the 
first paragraph and in the second paragraph he states in 
effect that Plaintiff has acquired, by purchase and exchange 
over the counter, various milk and cream bottles, and that 
unless a bottle is presented by a purchaser a deposit is 
required. The word "acquired" would assume that Plaintiff 
has some interest in the bottles. A determination of this 
question to a large extent determines the issues before the 
court. The facts are ( 1) that a milk bottle costs about 
8c; (2) that a milk bottle that has been used 10.0 times, so 
long as it is not chipped or cracked, is just as valuable as 
a new bottle and cannot be distinguished from a new bottle; 
( 3) that Plaintiff has acquired such bottles as he may have 
in his possession from junk men, second-hand dealers or by 
exchange over the counter for bottles that were so acquired; 
and ( 4) that the bottles so acquired by Plaintiff were ac-
quired from people who had no title or right to the posses-
sion of said bottles. 
In other words, for many years past it has been the 
custom in Salt Lake City for a dairy to sell the milk or 
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cream contained in the bottle and as a service to deliver 
the milk and cream in a refillable glass container, with an 
implied agreement or understanding that the purcha~er may 
use the bottle for the purpose of dispensing the milk or 
cream therein contained, and that when the t'ontents of the 
bottle have been dispensed the bottle will be returned to the 
party from whom it was purchased or placed in such a place 
that it may be repossessed by the owner of the bottle. 
Plaintiff's assumption that the purchaser of the milk 
contained in the glass bottle thereby acquires some interest 
in the bottle is false and contrary to custom and common 
sense. Neither the Plaintiff. nor any other dairy, can pay 
8c for a bottle, pay the farmer 5c for milk to go in it, pas-
teurize and bottle the milk, put a cap on it and deliver it 
to either a home or a store for 8-, 9- or lOc a quart. This 
being true, we might pose the question, if the dairies do 
not sell their bottles, how can Plaintiff acquire any interest 
therein? 
Bear in mind that $50,000.00 a year is involved in this 
litigation. That is the price that the consumers of market 
milk in Salt Lake City are now paying for the inability of 
the dairies to reclaim their bottles and this amount is being 
paid by the consumers and not by the dairies. 
The second question is asked-how can Plaintiff sell 
an 8c bottle for 5c and stay in business? The answer is that 
Plaintiff does not pay 8c for his bottles because the Plain-
tiff acquired bottles belonging to the other dairies from 
junk men and second-hand dealers, paying 2c or 3c for each 
bottle. Plaintiff has a lucrative business, wherein he pay8 
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2c or 3c for bottles belonging to other dairies and sells them 
over the counter for 5c. 
So it is respectfully submitted that the first question 
to be determined in this law suit is whether or not Plaintiff, 
by his mode of purchasing bottles, acquires any interest 
whatsoever in and to the trade-marked bottles of other 
dairies located in Salt Lake City, and it seems clear, accord-
ing to the cases hereinafter cited, that he does not. There 
is nothing in the statement of facts of Plaintiff's brief or 
anywhere in his argument to show how a dairy located in 
Salt Lake City, owning a bottle which is trade-marked and 
can be readily identified, loses its title to the bottle. 
A word as to the trade-mark phase of this case. The 
answer of Defendants shows that pursuant to the search 
and seizure warrant issued by Defendant, the Honorable 
Lewis V. Trueman, trade-marked milk bottles belonging to 
sixteen Salt Lake City dairies were seized and taken from the 
place of business of Plaintiff. Plaintiff did not own these 
bottles and had no interest whatsoever in and to the bottles 
and Plaintiff knew who the owners of these bottles were 
and knew that he had no right to the bottles. If evidence 
were to be presented to this Court it would also show that 
all sixteen of the dairies have Grade "A" permits, issued 
by the Board of Health of Salt Lake City, and that all of 
the milk distributed by said dairies to the citizens of Salt 
Lake City in these bottles is Grade "A" milk; and would 
show that the citizens of Salt Lake City, when they buy 
milk in these trade-marked bottles, recognize that milk as 
being Grade "A" milk, meeting the requirements of their 
City ordinance. The evidence would also show that Plain-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
13 
tiff's place of business is located just north of the north 
boundary of Salt Lake City and that he does not have a 
Grade "A" permit issued by Salt Lake City and that he may 
put in these trade-marked bottles any kind of milk he sees 
fit. It may be high or it may be low in butterfat; it may 
have high or low bacteria count, but there is no inspection 
of the milk and what goes in the bottles is what Plaintiff 
may from time to time determine. The evidence would 
further show that most of the milk sold by Plaintiff is pur-
chased by residents of Salt Lake City, who are acquainted 
with the sixteen dairies above referred to and who know 
that the sixteen dairies are holders of Grade "A" permits, 
and who have come to rely upon the trade-marks of these 
dairies as a guarantee of the fitness of the product contained 
in the bottle for human consumption. 
The evidence would further show that when one of these 
trade-marked bottles is filled with milk by Plaintiff, the 
only distinguishing character between the bottles so filled 
and one filled by the owner of the trade-mark and owner 
of the bottle, is the paper cap placed in the top of the bottle, 
and that the milk buying public as such has come to rely 
upon the trade-marks conspicuously blown into the glass 
rather than upon the paper cap placed in the top of the bottle. 
The third question may now be properly posed. If 
Plaintiff may merchandise his milk in the trade-marked 
containers of other dairies, why can not a small canning 
company affix the labels of the Del Monte brand to its cans, 
providing it acquires the labels from people who purchased 
the original canned goods? Why can not the service station 
dealer who has purchased a bulk oil tank from the Standard 
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Oil Company refill it with an unnamed product and display 
it at his place of business with its label of Standard Oil Com-
pany upon it? These examples could be multiplied a hun-
dredfold. 
On the top of page 3 in Plaintiff's statement of the 
case he implies that some security should be demanded for 
the return of the bottles. In other words, Plaintiff would 
have Defendants place themselves in the same place they 
were in 1928 when this Court said they were without relief 
in 
Clover Leaf Dairy v. Van Gerven, supra. 
Plaintiff, in his brief, argues the sufficiency of the 
remedy provided by Chapter 16, Title 104, Revised Statutes 
of Utah 1933. To recover personal property as provided 
by this section it is necessary for the Plaintiff to make an 
affidavit describing the property claimed. A moment's 
reflection would show the inadequacy of this remedy. 
A dairy, and in this respect Plaintiff is no exception, 
receives during the course of the day a certain number of 
empty bottles, which are washed and filled with milk and 
sold and delivered in not to exceed 36 hours. Dealing, as 
Plaintiff does, in the trade-marked bottles of all the dairies 
of Salt Lake City, it immediately becomes apparent that 
no dairy could possibly know from time to time how many, 
if any, of its bottles were in the possession of Plaintiff. It 
is also respectfully submitted that none of the dairies of 
Salt Lake, their agents or employees, have the right of 
access to Plaintiff's place of business, so there is no way 
of determining from time to time how many, if any, bottles 
belonging to each respective dairy are in Plaintiff's use. 
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It further becomes apparent that if. by some means, 
fair or foul. a dairy should learn thnt a given numb('r of 
bottles was being used by Plaintiff, before it could go 
through the mechanics of dictating and filing a complaint. 
preparing an affidaYit and posting a bond, get the sheriff 
to Plaintiffs' place of business. the Plaintiff may or may not 
have in his possession any of the bottles which he had 
possessed an hour or so preYiously. 
And another fact that is very pertinent in this matter 
is that a milk bottle is worth 8c. Of the 724 bottles seized 
by the sheriff 1 bottle belonged to the Romney Dairy, while 
164 containers belonged to the Clover Leaf Dairy. The ques-
tion might be asked as to how much of a lawsuit a dairy 
could maintain for one 8c milk bottle or for 164 milk bottles 
worth $13.12. And yet it immediately becomes apparent 
that the 724 milk bottles have a fair value of $57.92 and if 
this is a fair example of the use to which Plaintiff puts the 
bottles of other dairies, it could then be multiplied by 365, 
which means Plaintiff uses $21,140.80 worth of bottles 
per year that he has no right to. This indicates the damage 
suffered by the dairies in Salt Lake by the conduct and 
action of Plaintiff, and clearly entitles the dairies to some 
adequate relief. Some relief which will permanently estop 
Plaintiff from using and trafficking in the trade-marked 
bottles of other dairies. 
Plaintiff, in his brief, complains that no criminal com-
plaint has been filed, as a result of the issuance and service 
of the search and seizure warrant in question. Plaintiff, 
however, does not complain about the continuances the court 
has granted in two pending criminal cases. Until these are 
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disposed of there is nothing to be gained by new complaints. 
There seems to be a belief extant that a determination by 
this court of the first question hereinafter set forth would 
aid the court in disposing of the pending criminal cases. 
QUESTIONS FOR DETERMINATION 
There are two questions presented to the court in this 
matter. First, has the Plaintiff any right in law to use the 
trade-marked bottles of other dairies in the operation of 
his cream station? Second, is the procedure provided by 
Title 95, Chapter 2, Revised Statutes of Utah, as amended 
by Chapter 110, Laws of Utah, 1939, a constitutional pro-
cedure to recover trade-marked bottles and to revest the 
owners thereof with possession? 
ARGUMENT 
THE OvVNER OF A TRADE-MARKED BOTTLE DOES 
NOT LOSE TITLE TO THE SAME WHEN IT IS 
DELIVERED TO A PURCHASER OF THE MILK 
CONTAINED THEREIN. 
Although this proposition is not directly announced in 
Clover Leaf Dairy v. Van Gerven, supra 
it is respectfully submitted that the opinion therein indicates 
such to be the fact. This court also had an opportunity 
of passing upon this particular question in the case of 
Allen v. Lindbeck, 93 P. (2d) 920 (Utah). 
but saw fit to leave it unanswered. 
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The pertinent part of the statute, 95-2-11, amended 
by Chapter 110 as above stated, reads as follows: 
"95-2-11. Transfer of Ownership to Be in Writing. 
(1) The ownership of or right to use any such name, 
mark, brand. or device may be transferred only by 
an instrument in writing, duly acknowledged by the 
vendor, and filed in the office of the secretary of 
state. Until such instrument shall have been filed 
as aforesaid the ownership in and right to the use 
of such name. mark, brand or device shall be deemed 
not to have passed and any intended transfer shall 
be deemed to be incomplete and not to be valid or 
effective for any purpose. 
"(2) No property rights whatsoever or interest 
or right of possession or use in or to any receptacle, 
container, carrier, box, equipment or supplies, bear-
ing or having stamped, impressed or produced there-
on, any name, mark, brand or device, claim to which 
has been filed and published as aforesaid, shall be 
granted, assigned, surrendered or declared other-
wise than by act or operation of law or by bill of sale 
or other conveyance in writing subscribed by the 
party granting, assigning or surrendering the same 
or by his la"\\rful agent thereunto authorized by writ-
ing." 
If this section means what it says, and there is nothing 
in Plaintiff's brief to indicate to the contrary, then in view 
of the fact that no deposit for any of these bottles has ever 
been taken, as condemned in the 
Clover Leaf Dairy v. Van Gerven, supra 
case, then there is no reason and no argument that the 
ownership of these bottles or any property rights in them 
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whatsoever has ever left the owner of the registered trade-
mark appearing on the bottles. 
In the absence of any statute whatsoever, the practice 
of refilling trade-marked containers has been condemned. 
The rule is well stated in 
60 A. L. R. 285 
as follows: 
"It may be stated as a general rule, without appar-
ent dissent, that the use of a rival's bottle, tank, or 
other container for the sale of a competing product, 
where the purpose and effect of such use are to en-
able the producer or retailer to pass off the user's 
product as the product of the manufacturer orig-
inally using the container, is unfair competition, 
warranting the issuance of an injunction to prevent 
such use." 
The following cases support this proposition: 
Evans v. Von Laer (1887; C. C.) 32 F. 153 
Sawyer Crystal Blue Co. v. Hubbard (1887; 
C. C.) 32 F 388 
Hostetter Co. v. Brueggeman-Reinert Distilling 
Co. P891; C. C.) 46 F. 188 
Pontefact v. Isenberger (1900; C. C.) 106 F. 499 
Hostetter Co. v. William Schneider fVholesale 
W1:ne & Liquor Co. (1900 C. C.) 107 F. 705 
(dismissed on motion of appellant in (1901) 
49 C. C. A. 673, 110 F. 1007) 
Hostetter Co. v. Marl'inoni (1901; C. C.) 110 
F. 524 
Van Hoboken v. Mohns & Kaltenbach (1901; 
C. C.) 112 F. 528 
Hostetter Co. v. Gallagher Stores (1905; C. C.) 
142 F. 208 
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Prest-O-Lite Co. v. Post & L. Co. (1908; C. C.) 
163 F. 63 
Moxie Co. v. Bagoian (1912; D. C.) 197 F. 680 
(affirmed in (1913) 124 C. C. A. 319, 206 
F. 437) 
Prest-O-Lite Co. v. Bogn1 (1910 C. C.) 209 F. 
915 
Prest-O-Lite Co. v. Da l'is ( 1913; D. C.) 209 F. 
917 (affirmed in ( 1914) 131 C. C. A. 491, 
215 F. 349) 
Hennessy v. Trine Growers' .-lsso. (1914; D. C.) 
212 F. 308 
Trade-mark statutes, wherein trade-marked refillable 
glass milk containers are involved, have been sustained by 
the Kansas court in 
and 
Wichita v. Fletcher. 56 P. (2d) 106 
Wichita National Milk Dealers v. Capp, 59 P. 
(2d) 29, 
while the California court has upheld its bottle law in 
8 P. (2d) 140 
and the Colorado court has upheld its bottle law in 
Denver Milk Bottle Case v. McKinzie, 287 P. 868 
The foregoing cases clearly demonstrate the proposi-
tion that the Plaintiff had no right in law to the possession 
of the milk bottles seized by the Sheriff of Davis County; 
he had no title to them and he had no right to use them. 
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THE PROCEDURE PROVIDED BY TITLE 95, CHAPTER 
2, REVISED STATUTES OF UTAH, 1933, AS 
AMENDED BY CHAPTER 110, LAWS OF UTAH 
1939, IS A CONSTITUTIONAL PROCEDURE. 
We then come to the second proposition, to wit: Is the 
procedure provided by Title 95, Chapter 2, Revised Statutes 
of Utah, as amended by said Chapter 110, a constitutional 
procedure to recover trade-marked bottles and to revest the 
owners thereof with possession? In other words, Plaintiff, 
having no right, title or interest in or to the milk bottles 
found in his possession and used by him, as disclosed by the 
record in this case, and it being apparent from what has 
been said heretofore, that there exists no adequate remedy 
in law by which the owners of the bottles may regain posses-
sion thereof, and the legislature having, by Section 95-2-10, 
as amended by said Chapter 110, set forth a procedure 
which will allow the owners of trade-marked bottles to re-
possess them, there remains but one question, that is, 
whether or not this Court finds the procedure therein set 
forth so repulsive to the constitution of this state that it 
can be fairly said that the legislature, by providing the 
procedure therein set forth, exceeded the authority vested 
in it by law. 
This Court has announced, in the case of 
Lehi City v. Meiling, 48 P. (2d) 535, 
the presumption which attends all legislative enactments in 
the following language : 
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"In approaching the subject we have in mind the 
rule that when an act of the Legislature is attacked 
on grounds of unconstitutionality the question pre-
sented is not whether it is possible to condemn the 
act, but whether it is possible to uphold it. The pre-
sumption is always in favor of the validity, and 
legislative enactments must be sustained unless clear-
ly in violation of fundamental law. Wadsworth v. 
Santaquin City, 83 Utah 321, 28 P. (2d) 161. Every 
presumption will be indulged in favor of legislation 
and only clear and demonstrable usurpation of power 
will authorize judicial interference with legislative 
action. Green v. Frazier, 253 U. S. 233, 40 S. Ct. 
499, 64 L. Ed. 878. It is a truism recognized by all 
the authorities that the Legislature of a state is 
vested with the whole of the legislative power of the 
state and may deal in any subject within the scope 
of constitutional government except as such power 
is limited or directed by express provision of the 
Constitution or necessary implication arising there-
from. 'State Constitutions are mere limitations, and 
not grants, of powers.' Salt Lake City v. Christensen 
Co., 34 Utah 38, 95 P. 523, 17 L. R. A. (N. S.) 898. 
"The presumption which attends every act of the 
Legislature is that it is within its power, and any 
one who would attack the legality of a legislative act 
must point to the particular provision of the organic 
act which he claims excludes such power from legis-
lative competence or demonstrate that is clearly 
excluded by necessary implications arising from con-
stitutional provisions. It is one of the objects of 
government to promote the public welfare of the 
state and provide for the material prosperity of its 
people. It is for the Legislature to determine the 
manner and extent to which it will exercise this 
function of government, and its determination upon 
that point is limited by its own discretion, and is 
beyond the interference of the courts. In re Madera 
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Irr. District, 92 Cal. 296, 28 P. 272, 675, 14 L. R. A. 
755, ""27 Am. St. Rep. 106." 
An analysis of said Section 95-2-10, as amended by said 
Chapter 110, indicates that the first paragraph provides 
for a method of issuing a search and seizure warrant. The 
second paragraph tells to whom it shall be issued. The 
third and fourth paragraphs tell how the warrant shall be 
executed. The fifth tells what shall be done after the taking 
of the property, the sixth sets forth a procedure to be 
followed by the court to determine the right to possession 
of property and the seventh paragraph tells the kind of an 
order the court shall enter, depending on its findings. 
Plaintiff charges this paragraph with being unconsti-
tutional and violating a number of sections of our state 
and federal constitutions. 
It might be well to briefly check this section with Chap-
ter 54 of Title 105, Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933. In the 
first place, Section 105-54-3 says that search warrants shall 
be issued only upon the findings of probable cause supported 
by oath or affirmation. The weakness of the former law 
in this respect, as pointed out in the case of 
Allen v. Lindbeck, supra 
has been corrected in the present enactment and is not 
questioned by Plaintiff. 
In the second place, under Section 105-54-2 a search 
warrant may be issued when the property is stolen or em-
bezzled. Also, when said property is in the possession of 
any person with intent to use as a means of committing a 
public offense. Both of these grounds seem to be satisfied 
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in the case in which the warrant was issued in the case at 
bar, as well as in the cases contemplated by Title 95 as 
amended. In other words, Allen does not own these bottles 
or have a right to possession or have a right to use them. 
His possession of them and filling them with milk consti-
tutes a public offense. 
It will be noted that as to the time of serving the war-
rant, Chapter 54 is broader than Chapter 2 of Title 95, in 
that warrants issued under Chapter 110, Laws of Utah 
1939, may be served only in the daytime, while search and 
seizure warrants issued under 105-54-1 may be served at 
night under certain specified conditions. It is to be noted 
that the duties of the peace officer in regard to the return 
to be made to the court is substantially the same in both 
enactments as well as the proviso as to giving of receipts. 
Chapter 55 of Title 105 provides the method by which the 
magistrate shall dispose of property coming into his pos-
session as the result of the execution of search and seizure 
warrant. It is to be submitted that the procedure outlined 
in 95-2-10, as amended by said Chapter 110, is more specific, 
more likely to insure justice than the procedure outlined in 
Chapter 55. 
In one of the cases cited by Plaintiff, that is, 
People v. Kempner, 101 N. E. (N. Y. 1913) 794, 
which is cited as an authority for the proposition that a 
search warrant is an improper method of trying title to 
property seized, the court therein predicates its holding in 
the following language : 
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"There is nothing in any of the provisions of the 
code of criminal procedure that authorizes a trial 
of the title to or possession of the property taken 
under the warrant." 
In another case cited by Plaintiff the court objected 
to the act in the following language at page 875: 
"* * * and when such property is brought be-
fore the court the act makes no provision for its 
disposition." 
Lippman v. People, 51 N. E. 872 (Ill. 1898) 
It is respectfully submitted that not only would the 
Kempner and Lippman cases have been decided differently 
had a provision similar to said Chapter 55, Title 105, been 
involved, but it would have been decided differently in view 
of the procedure specified in 95-2-10, Revised Statutes of 
Utah 1933, as amended by Chapter 110, Laws of Utah 1939. 
In other words, it seems to follow as a matter of law 
that if Plaintiff Allen is not entitled to use the bottles that 
were taken from him by the Sheriff of Davis County, and 
he has no title or right to possession thereof or any right to 
use them, then they could be taken from him by Chapter 54 
of Title 105, Laws of Utah 1933, and recovered by the true 
owner by the procedure set forth in Chapter 55 of said title. 
Any changes or differences that appear between the two 
sections just noted and the provisions of Section 95-2-10 
and said Chapter 110 are mostly differences in detail. 
Plaintiff, in his brief, cited certain authorities to the 
effect that the issuance of a search and seizure warrant to 
recover stolen milk bottles from a person who possesses them 
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without any right, under such circumstances that they nre 
effectively concealed, and for which there is no other nde-
quate remedy at law, is an illegal search and seizure. In 
People v. 1\.empner. supra. 
which Plaintiff cites as an authority for this proposition, the 
court said of the search and seizure warrant : 
"But their legality has long been considered to be 
established on the ground of public necessity, because 
without them felons and other malfactors would 
escape detection." 
which quotation seems to fit the problem before this court. 
Another case cited by Plaintiff, 
Briggs v. Shepard Jfanufacturing Co., 105 N. E. 
622 (Mass. 1914), 
contains an interesting statement by Judge Hammond rel-
ative to the purposes to be served by a search warrant at 
common law. 
"At common law, upon the return of a search war-
rant for personal property alleged to have been 
stolen, the magistrate upon the return of the warrant 
was to proceed as follows: If it appeared that the 
goods brought before him had not been stolen they 
were to be returned to the person in whose posses-
sion they were found; if it appeared that they were 
stolen, they were not to be delivered to the owner 
but to be deposited in the hands of the officer who 
executed the warrant, to the end that the party 
from whom they were stolen might proceed to com-
plain of the offender, and upon conviction of him 
might have restitution of them." 
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On the basis of Judge Hammond's statement it would 
appear that the procedure here complained of by Plaintiff is 
very little more than a codification of the common law. 
A most recent case from the California court, 
Pacific Coast Dairy v. Police Court, 8 P. (2d) 
140, 80 A. L. R. 1217 
reviews the principal cases cited by Plaintiff, wherein the 
court had to pass on the following section of the act. 
"It shall be the duty of every person who finds or 
receives in the regular course of business or in any 
other manner any container marked with a brand 
registered under the provisions of this section to 
make diligent effort to find the owner thereof and to 
restore or return the same." 
Plaintiff contended the section was unconstitutional and re-
lied on the following cases: 
Horwich v. Walker-Gordon Lab. Co., 205 Ill. 497, 
68 N. E. 938, 98 Am. St. Rep. 254 
State v. Baskowitz, 250 Mo. 82, 156 S. W. 945, 
Ann. Cas. 1915A, 477. 
Yaeger v. State, 78 Fla. 354, 83 S. 525 
State v. Schmuck, 77 Ohio 438, 83 N. E. 797, 
14 L. R. A. (NS) 1128, 122 Am. St. Rep. 527 
State v. TViggam, 187 Ind. 159, 118 N. E. 684 
As to these cases, the court said : 
"These cases were considered at length in Bartolloti 
v. Police Court, 35 Cal. App. 372, 170 P. 161, 
where the District Court of Appeal, having under 
consideration the California Container Act of 1911 
(St. 1911, p. 416), rejected the authorities cited as 
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not applicable under the California Constitution, and 
cited with approval as an opposing line of authorities 
on similar statutes People v. Cannon, 139 N. Y. 32, 
34 N. E. 759, 36 Am. St. Rep. 668; Commonwealth v. 
Anselvich, 186 Mass. 376, 71 N. E. 790, 104 Am. St. 
Rep. 590; and Commonwealth v. Goldburg, 167 Ky. 
96, 180 S. W. 68. To the cases last cited Renner 
Brewing Co. v. Rolland, 96 Ohio St. 432, 118 N. E. 
118, may be added, a case which involved an amend-
ment of the statute considered in the earlier Ohio 
case of State v. Schmuck, supra, and which should 
now be taken as stating the Ohio rule. The opinion 
in the Bartolloti Case is the last expression of the 
appellate courts of this state upon the constitution-
ality of statutes relating to the use of containers 
generally, and it must be treated as rejecting the 
rule of the cases here cited by the appellant and as 
accepting the more liberal and general rule an-
nounced in People v. Cannon, supra, and in the other 
cases heretofore cited. 
"On principle, the General Dairy Law is mani-
festly a constitutional enactment, as it is designed 
to protect the traffic in milk and cream." 
The New York court, in 1930, in the case of 
People v. Ryan, (1930) 230 App. Div. 252, 243 
N.Y. S. 644 
l!eld that a statute which provided that no person should 
use any milk bottle having the name or initials of the owner 
stamped, marked, or fastened on such bottle, without the 
consent of the owner, was not unconstitutional, saying: 
"We fail to see how it can be said that this provi-
sion deprives anyone of his property without due 
process of law, or that it is discriminatory, arbitrary, 
or unreasonable." 
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It was also said that the statute was not beyond the police 
power of the state, as it tended to prevent fraud being 
practiced on the public, and served to promote the health, 
safety, and welfare of the community. 
CONCERNING THE USE OF THE SEARCH AND 
SEIZURE WARRANT 
Plaintiff has objected to the propriety of using a search 
and seizure warrant in the recovery of milk bottles. It is 
respectfully submitted that there are no cases cited by 
Plaintiff holding that a search warrant may not be so used. 
Plaintiff relies upon the historical background of the search 
and seizure warrant and in effect says that because search 
and seizure warrants have never been used to recover pos-
session of milk bottles, therefore, the legislature has no 
power to allow them to be so used now. 
This brings us to a consideration of the comparative 
powers and duties of the three departments of the American 
democratic government, as established by our state and 
federal constitutions. This being a subject which has been 
thoroughly explored in our newspapers and periodicals, and 
by speakers as well as by our courts and legislative bodies, 
during the past few years, any discussion which might 
be inserted herein would add little. Suffice to quote from 
an article appearing in the February issue of the Harvard 
Law Review, entitled "Some Aspects of American Consti-
tutional Law," by Thomas Reed Powell, Professor of Con-
stitutional Law at Harvard. 
Harvard Law Review, Vol. LIII, Page 529-530 
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"\Vith such apologies to the dictionary as may 
be its due, 'Aspects' must here do service in at least 
a double aspect. It includes segments and phases, 
and it includes approaches and points of view,-the 
thing looked at and the standpoint and attitude of 
the looker. The moon changes its aspect in its 
recurring phases, and any momentary phase may 
mean to the astronomer or the navigator something 
quite different from what it means to the song writer 
or the lover. Constitutional law somewhat resembles 
the moon, but with a significant difference. Neither 
the navigator nor the lover has any effect on the 
moon. Those who look officially at the Constitution 
may to an extent create it in their own image. When 
Taney took a different approach to the Constitution 
from that of Marshall, the Constitution became dif-
ferent from what it was before. Thus the different 
aspects of the aspects of Constitutional Law may 
become fused as they are often confused. Even the 
unofficial looker at the Constitution may see only 
the reflection of his own lenses. Among the un-
official lookers, some are lawyers, some are not. 
Among the official lookers, some lawyers look dif-
ferent and differently from others. 
"Even the casual reader of the newspapers is 
now aware that in recent years the Constitution has 
been rapidly changing its face. This way of putting 
it may seem to imply that the Constitution can itself 
administer the lipstick and the mascara and the 
wrinkle-remover. This, again, would be to confuse 
the two aspects of 'aspects.' For its face lifting the 
Constitution goes to a beauty parlor in which there 
are nine more or less co-operative beauticians, all 
lawyers, some former professors, some not. Of these 
nine lawyers, some have been more co-operative than 
others. For the past two terms, the two Supreme 
Court Justices longest in continuous service have 
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been the ones most often unable to see the Constitu-
tion that their majority colleagues pointed out to 
them, though they must have been aware that for 
the moment at least the majority made the Constitu-
tion look the way they looked at it. The four Juniors 
on the panel could not have done this by themselves. 
They needed the help of at least one other, and often 
got the help of three, one of whom at least was no 
sudden convert. 
"For the unofficial observer, the important con-
temporary fact is that the Constitution is in a process 
of change and that for a season the change is likely 
to push further and further. How far it will go or 
how long it will continue, no one can positively know. 
The Constitution has often followed an undulating 
course hitherto. Not a little of the recent change 
is a return to conceptions and attitudes previously 
dominant. In the first judicial interpretation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, Mr. Justice Miller for the 
majority saw nothing to a contention that the grant 
of a monopoly of butchering could deny due process 
to those compelled to sheathe their knives, and he 
doubted whether the equal protection clause had any 
application to others than those recently emancipated 
from slavery. When governmental fixing of maxi-
mum prices was first considered, it was declared that, 
when the power obtains, the limit of its exercise is 
to be set by the legislature and not by the courts. 
The later opposite attitudes were innovations before 
they became commonplaces. The erosion now in 
process may or may not take us back to the original 
boundaries. It can hardly take us beyond them." 
To say that the milk marketing industry, by reason 
of the dependence of the American public on its services, 
has not progressed beyond the status of a purely private 
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industry is to refuse to recognize indisputable facts. For 
many years certain service industries have been labelkd 
"public utilities." And under this label they have been 
regulated and in turn have exercised privileges and prerog-
atives not extended to purely private enterprises. Perhaps 
the label "public utility" is not truly or justly applicable 
to the milk industry, but by the same token the milk in-
dustry is so regulated, and the demands of the public upon 
it are so great, that it must be considered in its true light 
and not penalized through formal classification. 
So the question is, is the interest of the public in the 
market milk industry such that the legislature is justified 
in establishing a procedure which will allow the industry 
to recover its refillable glass milk containers? And it is 
respectfully submitted, in view of the foregoing, that the 
answer to this question should be in the affirmative. 
The alternative writ of prohibition should be dismissed 
and Defendant Trueman instructed to proceed with the 
hearing, as provided by Chapter 2, Title 95, Revised Statutes 
of Utah 1933, as amended by Chapter 110, Laws of Utah 
1939. 
Respectfully submitted, 
FABIAN, CLENDENIN, MOFFAT & MABEY, 
Attorneys for Defendants. 
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